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BROWN IS DEAD! LONG LIVE BROWN!: THE
ENDLESS ATTEMPT TO CANONIZE A CASE
Gerald N. Rosenberg*
welcome this Special Issue on twentieth-century constitutional
history and the major article by Michael Klarman placing Brown
in historical context. Far too much writing by legal academics
obscures the larger political, social, economic, and cultural environment in which courts operate, decisions are issued, and behavior is
modified. Klarman's careful and detailed analysis focuses on these
crucial factors. In contrast to the artificial separation between legal
analysis and work in the social sciences, Klarman's approach demonstrates the richness of genuine, multidisciplinary analysis.
In the first part of his Article, Klarman lays out the factors that
fostered segregation. The argument is well-known to social scientists and Klarman does a good job reviewing and condensing the
secondary literature.' In Part II, however, Klarman plows less cultivated fields and offers an interesting twist on the conventional
claim that Brown set the stage for the civil rights movement and
legislative action. I will focus my comments on this argument.
Klarman's aim is to understand the question of "indirect causation, 2 in this case the relationship between Brown and the civil
rights legislation of the mid-1960s. Rejecting the conventional wisdom that Brown was crucial to the creation of the civil rights movement which, in turn, successfully pressured Congress and the

* Associate Professor of Political Science and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago.
A.B. 1976, Dartmouth College; B.A./M.A. 1979, Oxford University; J.D. 1983, University
of Michigan; Ph.D. 1985, Yale University. I gratefully acknowledge helpful comments
from Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Dan Kahan, Richard Ross, David Strauss, and Cass
Sunstein.
1 For fuller treatments, see Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of
Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (1982); Aldon D. Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights
Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change (1984).
2 Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 Va. L.
Rev. 7 (1994).
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executive for civil rights legislation,3 Klarman argues that Brown
directly led to the election of rabid segregationists throughout the
South. They, in turn, unleashed, or allowed to be unleashed, the
brutal suppression of civil rights demonstrators. It was this violence, brought to the consciousness of Americans throughout the
country by television, that shocked the nation and led to the enactment of civil rights legislation. Thus, Klarman concludes that
Brown did help bring about civil rights
legislation, but in a tortu4
ous, indirect, and "perverse" manner.
Klarman's attempt to find some beneficial effect from Brown is
clever and plausible, but ultimately unpersuasive. In essence, he
underestimates the deeply violent nature of Jim Crow and its
defenders, and he uncritically grants important causal influence to
Brown. Klarman is correct that television coverage of white violence inflicted on peaceful black demonstrators in the South, particularly at Birmingham and Selma, created a powerful pro-civil
rights constituency in the rest of the country.' He also makes a
plausible case that Brown led to the election of segregationist public officials who either encouraged such violence or allowed it to
take place. However, he does not succeed in making the case that
the actions of those officials added much to the violence. Oddly,
Klarman misperceives the nature of Jim Crow, presenting it as less
malign than it actually was. A more accurate and critical analysis
suggests that it was the actions of the civil rights demonstrators
themselves in the context of an entrenched system of apartheid
that led to violence. Racist public officials, propelled to public
office perhaps in part because of Brown, raised their ugly voices,
but they were overwhelmed in a cacophony of hatred. Like those
3 For a fuller treatment of the lack of evidence for Brown's causal significance, see
Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 49-57
(1991).
4 Klarman, supra note 2, at 13. Scheingold offers a somewhat similar argument:
Southern white resistance to Brown sparked the civil rights movement, which successfully
pressured Congress and the executive. See Stuart Scheingold, Constitutional Rights and
Social Change: Civil Rights in Perspective, in Judging the Constitution: Critical Essays on
Judicial Lawmaking 73, 79-80 (Michael W. McCann & Gerald L. Houseman eds., 1989).
While both Klarman and Scheingold focus on the resistance Brown engendered, their
paths of causal influence differ.
5 For a full account of this argument, see David J. Garrow, Protest at Selma: Martin
Luther King, Jr., and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, at 133-60 (1978); Rosenberg, supra
note 3, at 107-56.
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defenders of Brown's importance whom Klarman criticizes, he,
too, overstates Brown's influence.
Part of the difficulty Klarman faces is that without considering
alternative explanations, he can offer only a speculative story of
causal influence. Putting the point, first, in somewhat abstract
terms (see Figure I), in order to argue convincingly that Brown (B)
caused later violence (V) rather than being merely correlated with
it, Klarman must show that the intervening demonstrations,
marches, and protests of the civil rights movement (D, M, and P)
did not, by themselves, cause V.6 Without such a showing, Klarman is left with merely a correlation, a relationship that could have
been caused by events following Brown. To make a persuasive
case, then, he must test not only for whether Brown led to violence
through his causal chain (B led to V), but also for whether the
movement and its actions led to violence independently of Brown
(events D, M, and P led to V independently of B). In so doing, he
must explore the effects of the apartheid system (all the A's) within
which all these events were occurring. For if causal connections
can be made where the causal factors are independent of Brown,
then violence and the civil rights legislation that followed from it
would have occurred without Brown. If this is the case, as I argue
it is, then whatever role Brown played in the election of extreme
segregationists had a negligible effect on violence inflicted on civil
rights demonstrators and on the ultimate enactment of civil rights
legislation.
Empirical examination supports my alternate explanation. The
violence Klarman finds crucial to the enactment of civil rights legislation was overdetermined. The civil rights movement on its own
created a sufficiently violent response to pressure the federal government to act. It was not Brown that was "indispensable to the
timing" of civil rights legislation as Klarman maintains,7 but rather
white violence in response to the actions of the civil rights move6 This is particularly the case since Klarman has argued, in my view correctly, that
Brown (B) did not create the civil rights movement nor lead to the actions the movement
took (events D, M, and P). See Klarman, supra note 2, at 75-84; see also Rosenberg, supra
note 3, at 107-56 (refuting the view that the Court and Brown created the civil rights
movement because such a view incorrectly and unsuccessfully simplifies a complex set of
events).
7 Klarman, supra note 2, at 76.
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FIGURE I
WHAT CAUSED VIOLENCE DIRECTED AT CIVIL RIGHTS
DEMONSTRATORS?: KLARMAN'S EXPLANATION AND
ROSENBERG'S ALTERNATIVE

N.
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KEY: A
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=
=
=
=

A

apartheid system
Brown decision
civil rights demonstrations
local southern elections

M = civil rights marches

P = civil rights protests
V = violence directed at civil rights activists
--

= Klarman's explanation
= Rosenberg's alternative explanation

N.B.: Both Klarman and I reject the argument that Brown played an
important role in leading to civil rights demonstrations, marches, and
protests. Thus, no lines connect Brown (B) with civil rights marches (M),
demonstrations (D), or protests (P). See discussion infra at 162-63 and
note 6.
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ment independent of Brown. Klarman himself notes that the depth
and strength of the apartheid system meant that black demands for
equal fights would be met with violent repression. It did not take
Brown for white southerners to understand that blacks marching
for civil rights' posed a major threat to the status quo. They
responded not to the abstract idea of equality contained in Brown
but to the actual public demand for it. It was the civil fights movement taking to the streets that incited violence. With or without
Brown, the events of the movement itself would have generated
politicians to represent and defend the system. Thus, while Klarman makes a strong case that Brown heightened the rhetoric of
rabid segregation, that rhetoric would have appeared as soon as
blacks acted. It was the threat to the system posed by black
southerners that was the main force creating the violent response.
Brown played a role, no doubt, in encouraging such violence, but it
would have happened without the Court's action. When examined
in the broader perspective, Brown was merely a ripple in a tidal
wave.
Post-Civil War southern history is full of examples of such violence directed at movements for civil rights. The unpleasant,
underlying fact is that white southerners, with the help of all levels
of government, constructed an entrenched system of apartheid
throughout the South. Any serious challenge to that system was
met with massive repression. And the most serious challenge came
not from a far away capital but from the other side of the tracks
when local black residents overcame their fear and publicly
demanded the basic rights of American citizenship and human
decency. After all, the white South had plenty of experience eviscerating federal mandates. For nearly a century it had emasculated
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the
law, and the Fifteenth Amendment guarantee of the right to vote,
rendering them essentially empty within a full-blown apartheid system. One Court holding, on its own, posed little challenge.
White violence in response to black demands for justice is an old
tactic. World War I, for example, was fought to "make the world
safe for democracy," but when blacks after the war attempted to
assert basic democratic rights for which they had fought and died,
whites unleashed a torrent of violence. As Klarman acknowledges,

HeinOnline -- 80 Va. L. Rev. 165 1994

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 80:161

recorded lynchings increased dramatically in 1918 and 1919.8 And
violence was not limited to the South. Woodward notes twentyfive major race riots during the last six months of 1919, some in
northern cities like Chicago.9
The general expectation of white violence directed at proponents
of civil rights is illustrated by the first Freedom Ride, the 1947
Journey of Reconciliation. No attempt was made to travel into the
deep South because activists thought it would be a suicide mission. 10 Indeed, when Thurgood Marshall heard of the plan he
warned that "'[a] disobedience movement on the part of Negroes
and their white allies, if employed in the [deep] South, would result
in wholesale slaughter with no good achieved.""' And when the
second Freedom Ride was launched in 1961, the level and brutality
of the violence was extraordinary. 2 Brown was unnecessary to
lead white southerners to violently resist civil rights.
Violence against blacks and civil rights workers was commonplace throughout the South during the civil rights movement of the
1960s. Spectacular cases such as the murder of Medgar Evers, the
attacks on the Freedom Riders, the Birmingham church bombing
that killed four black girls, and the murder of three civil rights
workers near Philadelphia, Mississippi, are well-known. Countless
other bombings and numerous murders occurred throughout the
South.'3 During the Freedom Summer of 1964, in Mississippi alone
there were 35 shooting incidents, 30 bombings, 35 churches burned,

8 McAdam, supra note 1, at 89 (presenting a table of statistics reporting an increase in
lynchings from thirty-six in 1917 to sixty in 1918 to seventy-six in 1919). This violence is
acknowledged by Klarman, who points out that those lynched included black veterans,
some wearing their uniforms. See Klarman, supra note 2, at 86 n.368.
9 C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 114-15 (3d rev. ed. 1974).
10 See August Meier & Elliott Rudwick, CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement
1942-1968, at 34 (Illini Books 1975) (1973).
11Meier & Rudwick, supra note 10, at 35 (quoting Thurgood Marshall).
12 James Farmer, Lay Bare the Heart: An Autobiography of the Civil Rights Movement
202-03 (1985); Howell Raines, My Soul is Rested: Movement Days in the Deep South
Remembered 113-16, 120-21 (Penguin Books 1983) (1977). See Klarman notes this as well.
See Klarman, supra note 2, at 73.
13 See J.W. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School
Desegregation 136, 159 (1961); Southern Regional Council, Special Report: Law
Enforcement in Mississippi 7-17 (1964).
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80 beatings, and 6 murders.14 It was a brave soul indeed who
worked to end segregation in the South.
The Voter Education Project illustrates the crucial role of violence as a response to any public attempt by southern blacks to
challenge segregation. Launched during the Kennedy administration, its official aim was to create local pressure for civil rights by
increasing black voter registration in the southern states. The project's unofficial aim was to end civil rights demonstrations and
marches that received publicity, led to violence, and pressured and
embarrassed the administration. Indeed, Project participants were
expressly prohibited from taking direct action, creating great
debate among some groups over whether to join the Project. But
both sides miscalculated, and violence often accompanied attempts
at registration. For a black rural southerner to attempt to register
to vote was to demonstrate an independence of spirit and a degree
of courage that threatened the whole southern apartheid system in
a way that unenforced Court decisions never could. 15
Klarman responds that the level of both violence and racial rhetoric in the years prior to Brown were lower than in the 1960s.
Klarman makes a strong case but it does not show a causal connection between Brown and racial violence. This is because there
were no mass events like the Montgomery bus boycott, the sit-ins,
the Freedom Rides, the large demonstrations at Birmingham and
Selma, and so forth in the South in the pre-Brown days. Before
Brown, southern blacks were not challenging all that was sacred to
the apartheid system in a public, massive, and visceral way.
Klarman shows some awareness of the basic thrust of my position but does not integrate it into his argument. He comments that
the "vast majority of southern whites in the 1950s favored racial
14 Doug McAdam, Freedom Summer 257-82 (1988); Garrow, supra note 5, at 21; Pat
Watters & Reese Cleghorn, Climbing Jacob's Ladder: The Arrival of Negroes in Southern
Politics 139 (1967).
15 For confirmation of this interpretation see Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters:
America in the King Years 1954-1963, at 478-79 (1988); Clayborne Carson, In Struggle:
SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s, at 39 (1981); James Forman, The Making of
Black Revolutionaries 264-65, 269 (Open Hand Publishing Inc. 1985) (1972); Herbert H.
Haines, Black Radicals and the Civil Rights Mainstream, 1954-1970, at 156 (1988); Meier &
Rudwick, supra note 10, at 173-75; Victor S. Navasky, Kennedy Justice 21, 98-99, 128
(1977); Watters & Cleghorn, supra note 14, at 50-55.
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segregation,"' 6 and notes "how deeply entrenched Jim Crow
remained in the heart of the deep South."'17 He points out, further,
that the "timing of the Brown backlash depended on the white
conservatives' perception of the imminence of the desegregation
threat, which turned more on events like NAACP school desegregation petitions or crises like Autherine Lucy's attempted desegregation of the University of Alabama in early 1956 than on the
Brown decision itself."'1 8 In other words, it was not the Brown
decision but rather the visceral challenge to segregation of blacks
acting in the local areas that engendered a violent response. 19
Klarman does not show that such a violent response would have
been absent if Brown had not been decided. The history of southem apartheid powerfully argues otherwise.
Klarman also notes that given the strength and depth of the
apartheid system, moderate individuals, businesses, and governments were vulnerable to political and physical attack from more
extreme segregationists. "Just as within a single state the black belt
could pull along more moderate racial opinion, so within the South
as a whole, extremist states could pressure their more moderate
neighbors into conformity. ' 20 He notes, for example, that in
Arkansas many "businessmen and other racial moderates, who had
resented Governor Faubus's efforts to instigate racial discord in
Little Rock, felt obliged to rally around him once Eisenhower had
sent in the 101st Airborne."' 21 But this has nothing to do with
Brown. Given a white southern political, economic, social, and cultural system of apartheid, it did not require a Court decision to
spur extreme segregationist politics and violent resistance once
local blacks started their challenge. Locked in a segregationist system and culture, individuals, businesses, and governments had
every incentive to support the status quo once opposing it became
costly.
16 Klarman, supra note 2, at 106.
17 Id. at 74.
18 Id. at 98 n.419.

19 Thus, Governor Coleman of Mississippi, who served after Brown (1955-59), was able
to oppose "some of the more extreme massive resistance measures" because there were no
mass, public, civil rights actions in Mississippi at the time. Klarman, supra note 2, at 119.
20 Id. at 108.

21 Id. at 110.
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Given this reality, civil rights forces could pick and choose where
to stage demonstrations in order to incite white violence and gain
leverage against the federal government. As Garrow notes, and
Klarman correctly reports, King came to realize that "unprovoked
white violence aimed at peaceful and unresisting civil rights demonstrators" was "necessary for a protest to receive the national
coverage, attention, and support that would help to bring about
federal legislation."'
For example, demonstrations in Albany,
Georgia, in late 1961 and early 1962 were considered unsuccessful
because of a lack of violence73 The lack of violence translated into
little media coverage, no pressure on the federal government, and
a perceived weakening of King. 4 Thus, the movement increasingly
searched out cities where a violent response was likely to occur.
The presence of Bull Connor in Birmingham and Jim Clark in
Selma made those cities attractive targets. As Klarman notes, at
Selma, "[d]uring [Sheriff] Clark's initial phase of restraint, the
SCLC [Southern Christian Leadership Conference] apparently
contemplated moving the campaign into the countryside, where a
more violent white response would be assured."5 Similarly, the
genesis of Freedom Summer 1964 was the knowledge that white
Mississippians would respond violently to civil rights activity, as
they had been doing with murderous consistency. However, it was
believed that if many of the victims were northern white college
students from privileged backgrounds rather than poor blacks, the
nation would take notice. 26 Violent defense of apartheid independent of Brown was more than sufficient to create national revulsion
and enormous pressure for civil rights legislation.
Klarman is aware of this dynamic and of the depth and strength
of the segregation system. His argument is unpersuasive, however,
because he is unable to differentiate the effect of Brown from the
22 Garrow, supra note 5, at 2; see also id. at 222, 225 (detailing the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference's protest strategy and recounting Martin Luther King, Jr.'s version
of that strategy); David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference 171-72, 216-17, 228 (1986) (same).
23 Garrow, Bearing the Cross, supra note 22, at 216-18. For a survey of the Albany
protest, see id. at 173-230.
24 Id. at 216-18.
25 Klarman, supra note 2, at 148 n.625.
26 McAdam, supra note 14, at 35-40. The accuracy of these understandings was quickly
confirmed with the brutal murders of Chaney, Goodman, and Schwerner in June.
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effect of later events and from the causal influence of the larger
culture. His examples of Ole Miss, Wallace's election in 1962, Birmingham, and Selma all occur after the Montgomery bus boycott,
the sit-ins, the Freedom Rides, etc. He offers no way to distinguish
the influence of Brown from that of these latter events. I have
argued that these latter events, occurring in the southern apartheid
system, and not Brown, led to the violent repression of Birmingham and Selma.27 Klarman has plausibly argued that "Brown produced a southern political climate in which racial extremism
flourished," 28 but that does not support his conclusion of nontrivial
causal influence for Brown. He has not shown that violence would
have been absent without Brown. The evidence suggests that violence came quickly and often when blacks took the movement to
the streets.
Like many before him, Klarman has striven mightily to find a
central role for the Court in producing significant social reform.2 9
Yet surprisingly, Klarman himself admits that the chain of causation created by Brown was "strikingly indirect, and indeed almost
perverse. "30 The lesson of Klarman's analysis of Brown is that the
Court can be used to create opposition in the hope that it behaves
so badly as to sway the public in one's favor. Even if Klarman is
27 Note, too, that the violence that caused the national revulsion did not occur until the
1960s, at least six years after Brown. The violence at Birmingham and Selma, identified by
Klarman as well as others as key events, occurred in 1963 and 1965, nine and eleven years
after Brown respectively. It is difficult to see how the immediate move to the right after
Brown that Klarman notes drove these events. Rather, it seems more plausible that the
demonstrations themselves, as well as the earlier actions of the movement, in the context
of an apartheid system, created violent resistance.
28 Klarman, supra note 2, at 117.
29 Citations are legion. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976) (asserting that the role of the courts in social
progress, though problematic, is central and necessary to that progress); Owen M. Fiss, The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1979)
(asserting that the Court, through structural reform, gives character to public values);
Aryeh Neier, Only Judgment: The Limits of Litigation in Social Change (1982) (discussing
debate over whether the court plays too large a role in creating public policy); Victor
Yannacone, Discussion, in Law and the Environment (Malcolm F. Baldwin and James K.
Page, Jr., eds., 1970) (assessing problems faced in environmental practice and proposing
needed changes in court procedure for successful environmental policymaking); Council
for Public Interest Law, Balancing the Scales of Justice: Financing Public Interest Law in
America (1976) (detailing history of public interest law and asserting need for funding
public practice so that social change can occur through the court system).
30 Klarman, supra note 2, at 76.
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right in his causal attribution, this is an uncontrollable and dangerous way to bring about change. It is akin to arguing in favor of a
self-inflicted wound on the ground that if you survive, sympathy
will flow to you. Would any responsible lawyer recommend such a
31
strategy?
The bizarre nature of Klarman's causal argument raises the question of why he has engaged in this prodigious effort to find, at best,
a complicated and tortuous causal connection. Why is defending
the efficacy of Brown so important? The answer, I think, is that
Brown is the symbol of the use of courts to produce significant
social reform.32 It provides legitimacy and a sense of purpose to
liberal-leaning legal academics. Noble as this quest may be, it can
not be undertaken in isolation from broader societal forces.
Although more careful and thoughtful than most, Klarman's analysis is unpersuasive because, in the end, it focuses too closely on the
Court and not closely enough on the society in which the Court
operates. Brown is without doubt one of the Court's greatest decisions, but this does not mean it helped very much to further the
cause of civil rights.

This assumes, of course, that you win the case!
In addition to the sources cited by Klarman, supra note 2, at 8 n.2, see Robert L.
Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 237, 237 (1968) (calling
Brown a "revolutionary statement of race relations law"); Jack Greenberg, The Supreme
Court, Civil Rights and Civil Dissonance, 77 Yale L. J. 1520, 1522 (1968) (asserting that
Brown "profoundly affected national thinking and has served as the principal ideological
engine" of the civil rights movement); Jack Greenberg, Litigation for Social Change:
Methods, Limits and Role in Democracy, 29 Record of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of
New York 320, 331 (1974) (calling Brown the "principal inspiration to others who seek
change through litigation"); Richard Kluger, Simple Justice 710 (1976) (asserting that
Brown was "nothing short of a reconsecration of American ideals"); Aryeh Neier, supra
note 29, at 57 (calling Brown the "symbol" of the Court's ability to produce significant
social reform).
31
32
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